Thomas Glyn Watkin, The Institute of Welsh Affairs Eisteddfod lecture, Bro Morgannwg 2012
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Let me begin by thanking the Institute for Welsh Affairs for its kind invitation to me to deliver its annual lecture here at the Eisteddfod this year. It’s an honour for me personally and also an opportunity to contribute to an important debate currently in the life of the nation.
A year ago, I had the privilege of contributing to a discussion on the Eisteddfod field in relation to a jurisdiction for Wales, a discussion that had been organised by the Law Society. In the meantime, the National Assembly has instituted an Inquiry by its Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee into the question,1 and the Welsh Government has also launched a consultation on the same subject.2 It was pleasing to behold the goodly number of responses received by the Constitutional Affairs Committee and to see how much interest there was now amongst the people of Wales in constitutional questions. It will be interesting to see what will result from all the work that is being done presently.
However, this is not the first time that the question of a separate judicial system for Wales has been canvassed. The concept of jurisdiction has been of importance in a number of debates concerning the legal status of Wales on more than one occasion. In the aftermath of the First World War, with the political map of Europe being redrawn, and even the political map of the British Isles being re-ordered as the Republic of Ireland left the United Kingdom, the question arose as to whether each part of what remained of the United Kingdom ought to have its own judicial system, that is separate jurisdictions for Northern Ireland, Scotland, and for England and Wales as distinct countries. During the deliberations of the Speaker’s Conference, a Sub-Committee was established under Lord Stuart of Wortley to consider this specific question. At the end of the day, no conclusive answer to the question was forthcoming, but among the recommendations that were considered, the Committee suggested that the question of a separate judicial system for Wales was one that should be addressed by a Welsh legislature whenever such a body came into existence.3 From the standpoint of 1920, this looks like a mighty kick into touch, but now, of course, the ball is back in play, and it’s interesting to remember that the report in the 1920s went on to say that any future devolution statute should contain a clause declaring clearly that the Westminster parliament should legislate to give Wales a judicial system whenever there was a request for such from a Welsh legislature.4
At the time, there was a lot of support for the idea of a separate judicial system for Wales amongst the country’s lawyers, especially amongst the judiciary and the bar in south Wales.5 It was also the case that some of the London-based officials of the British government argued strenuously against the idea, including Sir Claud Schuster, the Permanent Secretary at the Lord Chancellor’s Office.6 Schuster had been appointed to this post at a very young age, while still in his forties, and he was to stay in the post for over a quarter of a century. Consequently, he became very influential in his role as a civil servant, and more than once he used his influence to oppose legal developments regarding Wales. His argument in 1920 was that it wasn’t possible for Wales to have a separate judicial system from England because Wales did not have its own laws. A separate body of law did not exist for Wales in the same way that a separate body of law existed in Scotland and in Northern Ireland. He employed the same argument almost a quarter of a century later when discussing with his fellow civil servants the question of a Secretary of State for Wales.7 To some extent one can discern Schuster’s influence on the report in 1920 when considering the connections between the case for a judicial system and the existence of a Welsh legislature, that is an institution with the power to create a separate body of law for Wales.
The argument is an interesting one, because it makes a clear connection between the concept of a jurisdiction and a body of law, but the argument is also surprising when one considers the legal history of Wales a generation earlier. For there was indeed a reason for the support shown by the judges and barristers of south Wales for the idea of a separate judicial system, a reason arising as a consequence of what had occurred forty years earlier when the Westminster parliament legislated for Wales separately from England for the first time. The statute in question was the Sunday Closing (Wales) Act 1881.
As the proposed legislation was debated before the House of Commons in 1880 and 1881, among its opponents was the Conservative member for Bridport, Edward Warton. On the basis of principle, his argument was that it was not possible to legislate for Wales separately from England because England and Wales were one – one integral territory served by one judicial system. Inasmuch as Wales did not have its own separate judicial system, it was not possible to legislate for it. Wales was not a jurisdiction, therefore it was not possible for it to have its own body of law.8 The argument was not successful – the Prime Minister himself, William Gladstone, went to the House in order to back the bill.9 However, it’s clear that the argument made an impact upon the Welsh members and on the lawyers of Wales as they considered and remembered that Wales had its own law courts until 1830 – the Courts of Great Session – and if it was necessary for Wales to have its own judicial system in order to obtain its own enacted laws, perhaps it was time to get them back.10
Therefore, in the 1880s, the argument was that it was not possible for Wales to have its own laws because it didn’t have its own law courts, and forty years later the answer to the request for Welsh law courts was that that was not possible because Wales did not have its own laws. Either there is an element of circularity in this argument, or – and very importantly in the context of the present discussions – it is not possible to have one without the other. That is to say – once more reflecting the recommendations of the 1920 report – a separate body of law calls for the existence of a separate judicial system.
Up to now, I have been avoiding using the term jurisdiction – and that for a reason. There is more than one meaning to the word, and that has enabled it to be used somewhat subtly from time to time in a manner which conceals the circularity of some of the arguments against the legal development of Wales. Jurisdiction can mean ‘a territory which has its own laws’; it can also mean ‘a territory which has its own judicial system’. As a consequence, one can say – as in the 1880s – Wales cannot have its own legislation because Wales is not a jurisdiction, and again, as in 1920, Wales cannot have its own judicial system because Wales is not a jurisdiction. The fact that the word can be used in more than one sense allows it to be used in a manner which is superficially consistent, but in truth the consistency is not merely superficial but false – and that has allowed it to be used in a pretty devious manner from time to time in order to justify withholding from Wales legal developments that were being permitted, for example, in relation to Scotland.
Unfortunately, in the decades that followed, Scotland came to be used as a measuring rod virtually every time a question was raised regarding some distinct legal development for Wales. At the end of the 1930s, a little before the Second World War, the Government refused to let Wales have a Secretary of State of the same kind as Scotland possessed. Following a substantial increase in the special provision made for Scotland, the response of the Prime Minister, Neville Chamberlain, was that to compare Wales with Scotland was not relevant, because Scotland had its own legal system and administration even before the Scottish Office was created. Wales on the other hand had been incorporated into England during the 16th Century without any law or administrative system which merited the attention of a special minister.11 It is clear that comparing Wales with Scotland leads to unfavourable comparisons on the basis that Scotland was already a separate jurisdiction.
At the end of the Second World War, the whole body of Welsh MPs, with the support of some Welsh members of the House of Lords, asked that the question of a Secretary of State for Wales be reconsidered.12 The Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, pleaded that the government was too busy with other matters to turn its attention to so complex an issue – an answer which is, in a way, perfectly fair given the country was emerging from a world war.13 Despite that, however, one influential civil servant, Sir Alan Barlow, found the time to write to Sir Claud Schuster at the Lord Chancellor’s Office to draw his attention to the request.14 His fear was that parity with Scotland would mean a separate judicial system, while noting that the law of Scotland, and not only its administration, was different from that which pertained in England, which was not the case with regard to Wales. In his reply, Schuster admitted that the Secretary of State for Scotland did not have many powers with regard to the administration of justice apart from appointing magistrates, but despite that fact he suggested that it would be wise to keep the question of a separate jurisdiction within view because there was in Wales a history of what he described as ‘agitation’ in relation to the subject.15 Perhaps he was recalling the strength of feeling among the lawyers of south Wales after the First World War, but it is clear that he was unhappy with regard to what had been said by Ithel Davies in the 1930s to the effect that there would be a need to re-order the judicial system in Wales fundamentally if the Welsh language were to be accorded its proper place in the administration of justice in Wales, words used before even the Welsh Courts Act was passed in 1942.16 It’s perfectly clear this time that the civil servants were looking for reasons to refuse a legal development in relation to Wales, and that comparing Wales to Scotland gave them the opportunity to employ the subtle concept of jurisdiction as an excuse or a convenient reason for their refusal. There was a danger in comparing Wales to Scotland, and that danger continues to exist, and this is not the only sort of argument that it is dangerous to employ.
The argument against separate legislation for Wales on the grounds that Wales did not have a separate judicial system and the argument that it was not possible to create a separate judicial system for Wales because Wales did not have its own laws, both – despite the circularity of their reasoning – were at least arguments on the basis of constitutional principle. However, it was not only on the basis of principle that opponents based their arguments. From time to time, the idea of legal provision for Wales was mocked, perhaps to enrage its supporters and to provoke them to admit that nationalism was the principal foundation for their requests. In 1880 and 1881, Edward Warton MP argued hotly against specific legislation for Wales by stating that Wales was only a small part of England, although some people fancied that Wales was some sort of nation although it had never produced great men in the same way as Ireland.17 At the end of the day, the intention of legislating for Wales separately from England was a sign of weakness in the eyes of Edward Warton, a weakness which amounted to giving in to the wishes of extremists – “the fads and fancies of fanatics”.18
It is clear that there were very strong feelings at work on both sides of the debate during the 1880s. One cannot overestimate the contribution of Gladstone as Prime Minister in winning the day for the success of the bill. The principle of legislating separately for Wales was important to the Liberal Party and to Gladstone himself, for looking to the future the Act would be a foundation for the legislation that would disestablish the Church of England in Wales. That did not happen until shortly before the First World War, when a Welshman, David Lloyd George, was one of the foremost figures in the Liberal Party.
It was during Lloyd George’s time as Prime Minister, of course, that the question of a separate jurisdiction for Wales fell to be considered as part of the work of the Speaker’s Conference in 1920. By that time, Lloyd George was Prime Minister of a coalition government and the Lord Chancellor in his government was Lord Birkenhead, F.E. Smith, a former Conservative member of parliament and one of Lloyd George’s fiercest opponents at the time of his truly revolutionary People’s Budget in 1909, and also during the campaign to pass the legislation to disestablish the Church in Wales. As the Permanent Secretary of the government department which had F.E. Smith at the helm, Sir Claud Schuster decided to intervene in the work of the sub-committee of the Speaker’s Conference that was, in 1920, considering a judicial system for Wales. It is difficult to believe that the strength of feeling exhibited by F.E. Smith during the debates on the Welsh Church Bill were not at work once more behind the scenes when Schuster wrote to the Speaker, James Lowther, in February 1920 to say that the Lord Chancellor wished to give evidence before the committee.19 One must remember that this correspondence took place in the final weeks before the Welsh Church Act came into force at the end of March 1920.
Ten days after writing to the Speaker, Schuster wrote a letter to one of the County Court judges in south Wales, His Honour Judge Rowland Rowlands. In his letter, Schuster stated that he understood there to be a fair amount of support for the idea of a separate Welsh judicial system, while confessing that the idea was within limits desirable, but also expressing his concern that some of the proposals were too extreme, for instance, the notion of a separate Court of Appeal.20 It would appear that Schuster was ‘fishing’ in his letter in order to find out the strength of the support for a separate jurisdiction for Wales together with the content of the proposals that the supporters would present to the Sub-committee. Judge Rowlands answered straightforwardly with a comprehensive description of what a number of his fellow lawyers would like to see.21
Immediately he had received Rowlands’ answer, the tone of Schuster’s correspondence changed. He replied to Rowlands’ letter by return, a reply bearing the date 1 March 1920, asking what it was that actuated such demands, other than ‘vague national sentiment’, and starting to argue that there was not sufficient business before the civil courts in Wales to justify such a development.22 Without waiting for Rowlands to answer, he asked B.J. Bridgeman to undertake research into the costs of the County Courts in Wales and how much they raised in the way of fees.23 It would appear that Schuster had deliberately contacted Rowlands in order to discover the strength and nature of the argument in favour of a jurisdiction for Wales in order to prepare the case against such a development for presentation before the Sub-Committee. The manner in which he wrote to Rowlands in February is so different from the manner in which he wrote on St. David’s Day, after having received the information that he wanted, that it shows more than a trace of deviousness, particularly when one considers how swift was his uncompromising reply against the plan once he had the information in his hands. It’s obvious too that Rowlands had appreciated the situation, for in his reply a week later, he denied that national sentiment alone was behind the campaign for a Welsh jurisdiction and set out a number of practical considerations which supported such a development.24 Unfortunately, this moved the debate on to practical considerations, exactly what Schuster wanted.
When Sir John Sankey, a High Court judge at that time, asked to meet with F.E. Smith, Schuster insisted that Sankey meet with him, Schuster, as well.25 He ensured that he received a copy of the evidence that Lord Justice Bankes had given before the Sub-Committee during February.26 It is interesting to note that Sankey and Bankes were two of the three ‘wise men’ – the third was Lord Justice Atkin – who drafted the Constitution of the Church in Wales at this time, a constitution which contained comprehensive provisions for a system of courts to serve the Church following disestablishment.
The response of the Lord Chancellor’s department therefore to the request for a Welsh jurisdiction was to mock the idea as one based on ‘vague national sentiment’ and to gather information in order to demonstrate that the idea was unaffordable. In the same manner as Edward Warton MP had mocked the standards of Wales’ intellectuals forty years earlier, Schuster questioned whether it would be possible for Wales to produce a succession of talented individuals to be barristers before the Welsh courts and to serve as judges in them.27 He suggested that the most able lawyers would continue to move to London, and that successful people of the kind would not be willing to return to work in Wales.28
Little attention was paid by the Lord Chancellor’s department to any constitutional concept, despite their firm belief that it was not possible to create a separate judicial system for a territory that did not possess its own laws. This is the factor, of course, which has changed since 1920, and in the meantime the idea that the difference between the position of Wales and that of Scotland as regards their laws means that it is not possible for Wales to have elements of a separate jurisdiction has been disproved. Despite the fact that Wales did not have its own judicial system nor its own body of laws, Wales got its own Secretary of State in 1964 and by now, of course, there exists a Welsh legislature which the Speaker’s Conference in 1920 said should have the right to ask for a separate judicial system as well.29
Albeit that that is the case, it would be foolish to believe that the arguments which were founded upon those distinctions have completely disappeared. They either continue to operate or have been adapted to fit the new situation. In 1880, Edward Warton MP’s argument was that Wales was too small to be a jurisdiction, that its legal system was of a part with England, that it did not have individuals of talent and that only extremists wished to see developments that would divide the two nations. The same ideas can be seen at work amidst the evidence received and published by the Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee of the Assembly this year, albeit that the language is not quite as colourful.30 Even in reputable journals such as the Economist, when the question of Scottish independence was discussed earlier this year, the spectre was raised that vague national sentiment was at work and threatening to defeat practical considerations of much greater importance.31
Without a shadow of a doubt, and despite the fact that Wales now has its own legislature and that, as a consequence, a body of Welsh laws is developing, Sir Claud Schuster’s financial and practical objections will continue to be called into play so as to deny that a separate judicial system is a serious possibility. Having said that, there is an important difference between the context of the debate in the 1920s and the present moment. In 1920, it was only the government officials, the civil servants, who had access to the relevant facts concerning the financial position; today, by virtue of developments such as the Freedom of Information Act, supporters of a Welsh jurisdiction at least have the opportunity to obtain the same information provided they take advantage of that opportunity.
The strength of the argument for a separate jurisdiction for Wales at the present time is that it can now be based on constitutional and legal principles that have been accepted in the past by the institutions of the United Kingdom. It would be folly therefore, in my opinion, to abandon the solid ground of principle in order to deploy arguments that are open to mockery as vague sentiment or opposition on the ground of cost or practicality. The question is whether there is a case for a Welsh jurisdiction, and that question ought not to be answered in terms of finance and practicality, but on a constitutional basis. Wales has a body of laws and those laws have to be administered. Further, that body of laws contains laws made by a Welsh legislature and by Welsh Ministers who legislate bilingually. Therefore, should courts outside of Wales, where the Welsh laws do not apply, where Welsh is not an official language and where there is no right to use the Welsh language before the courts, should such courts be competent to administer laws which apply only in Wales? It is important to remember that it was only in the 1870s that the current judicial system of England and Wales was created in order to reflect the legal system which existed at that time.32 It is difficult to believe that if judicial systems were being designed today for England and Wales, the decision would be in favour of one system serving the two countries as opposed to provisions reflecting the current legal position of the two lands. It is after having answered that constitutional question on the basis of principle that the questions of cost and practicality should be considered. It is important that supporters of a jurisdiction for Wales ensure that the argument does not get moved from the firm ground of the constitutional question onto the shifting sands of costs and practicalities.
It is important also to ensure that the constitutional principles do not undergo adaptation during the course of the debate. Take Edward Warton MP’s unsuccessful argument at the start of the 1880s that one cannot legislate for Wales separately from England because Wales is not a jurisdiction in the sense of being a territory with its own judicial system. Although parliament has, since then, legislated quite frequently for Wales apart from England, vestiges of that argument remain. Today, a body of Welsh laws is developing, laws that apply only in Wales. Yet, despite that fact, all of those laws extend to England and Wales. Why? Because according to the accepted legal doctrine, the extent of laws has to correspond to the boundaries of the jurisdiction.33
Consider also the argument which insisted that it was not possible to have a Welsh judicial system in the absence of the existence of a body of Welsh laws. Nowadays, we have Welsh laws, but yet the argument is still advanced, but now adapted to saying that there must be a sufficient body of Welsh laws. This development of the argument is very interesting, because not only does it shift the goalposts, it also changes what is meant by scoring a goal. This is because the question “Has Wales got its own laws?” is susceptible to a ‘Yes’ or ‘No’ answer, while the answer to the question “Has Wales sufficient laws of its own to justify it having a separate jurisdiction?” can vary according to the opinion of the respondent.
To be reasonable, one cannot argue that a small number of distinct laws would justify the creation of a separate judicial system, and in truth the question of the sufficiency of the number of laws amounts to the same thing as asking whether a body of laws exists. Yet, as a matter of principle, one has to ask, who therefore has the right to answer that sort of question and to decide whether there is now a sufficient body of Welsh law to justify a Welsh judicial system? According to some of the recommendations considered by the Speaker’s Conference in 1920, it was a Welsh legislature that should answer that sort of question and the United Kingdom parliament should accept its answer and act to create a separate judicial system.34 At the end of the day, this is again a matter of constitutional principle, namely that it is the representatives of the people of Wales who should answer this question according to their view in a manner which is accountable to the people who elected them.
The Speaker’s Conference suggested that any devolution statute establishing a Welsh legislature should contain a clause declaring clearly that Wales should have its own judicial system as soon as a Welsh legislature requested one.35 Unfortunately, of course, there is no such clause in the devolution statutes. However, yet once more, the concept of jurisdiction was at work in the process of framing the devolution statutes, especially with regard to the Government of Wales Act 2006. We have already noted that the distinction between the applicability and the extent of Welsh laws arises from the idea that only one jurisdiction exists. However, the concept has affected even the kind of devolution settlement that Wales has obtained. According to an Appendix to the written evidence presented by the Secretary of State for Wales and the First Minister of Wales to the Welsh Affairs Select Committee of the House of Commons in November 2005, there were two options in relation to how to confer competence upon the Assembly to make primary legislation, namely:
- to specify the subjects on which the Assembly may legislate (the conferred powers model); or,
- to provide that the Assembly may legislate on anything except matters reserved to the UK Parliament (the reserved powers model, used with regard to the legislative competence of the Scottish parliament).36
The evidence recommended the former, and that was the option chosen. One of the reasons for the choice was the fact that Wales did not have its own distinct legal jurisdiction, with its own system of courts, judges, legal profession and provision for legal education. A jurisdiction of that sort was consistent with the power of the Scottish parliament to make changes in relation to what was described as ‘basic principles of law’.37 As Wales did not have a separate legal jurisdiction, it was not appropriate for its legislature to have the competence to make such changes. According to the Appendix:
“If the Assembly had the same general power to legislate as the Scottish Parliament then the consequences for the unity of the England and Wales legal jurisdiction would be considerable”, because “the courts would, as time went by, be increasingly called upon to apply fundamentally different basic principles of law and rules of law of general application which were different in Wales from those which applied in England”.38
As a result, the conferred powers model of devolving legislative competence was chosen.
Let us for a moment consider the reasoning of the Appendix. One cannot deny that the reserved powers model of devolving legislative competence would give the Assembly the power to change basic legal principles. However, the use of that power is only a possibility; such a use is not inevitable. If we look at countries around the world that were once ruled by Britain but which are now independent and have their own legal jurisdictions, do we discover disparities of the kind which the Appendix fears? The clear answer is that we do not. Not only in countries such as Australia and Canada, which are members of the Commonwealth, but even in the Republic of Ireland and in the United States, the similarity between the legal systems continues to be close enough to permit, for example, law teachers to move without much difficulty from one country to another. In addition, and very importantly, an honours degree in law from universities in England and Wales is accepted in a number of countries as a qualification in their own law, and a number of countries continue to insist that their barristers qualify in England. Australia obtained its own parliament at the beginning of the 20th Century, but the possibility of sending a case on final appeal to the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council continued until 1968. Moreover, the judges who sat on cases from Australia very frequently were all from the United Kingdom, without any experience of having practised or having acted in a judicial capacity in Australia.39 Despite the possibility that serious differences could develop in basic principles of law, that has not happened. It is difficult to believe, therefore, that there is a danger that the Assembly would legislate in so divergent a manner as to cause a total rift with other countries of the common law tradition.
It is instructive to remember, too, that judges from Scotland, without experience of practice or acting in a judicial capacity in England and Wales, and in spite of there being a really distinct legal tradition in their native land, were not only accepted as competent to sit on cases from England and Wales in the House of Lords, or now in the Supreme Court of the United Kingdom, but have been esteemed among the most distinguished judges of the Court. Consider, one excellent example, Lord Reid and his contributions to the development of the law of England and Wales in a number of fields, often in partnership with another distinguished judge, namely Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest. In the same way, judges from England and Wales, without any training or experience in the law of Scotland have regularly sat as judges of final appeal on cases from the Court of Session in Edinburgh.40 If that is possible in relation to Scotland, with a legal history and legal tradition entirely distinct from that of England, it is hard to credit that in the future the judges of the Supreme Court could not cope with any developments which may arise from the legislative competence of the National Assembly and interpretation by Welsh courts.
One cannot blame Welsh politicians for taking what was on offer in order to advance the legal identity of the nation, but one cannot also escape the fact that politicians at Westminster have over a long period found the concept of jurisdiction, with its multiplicity of meanings, very convenient as a reason to deny legal developments to this country. By emphasising that it was necessary to have a separate judicial system in order to have separate laws, some sought to block separate legislation for Wales, and then, when a judicial system was asked for, the answer came that this was not possible without separate laws. In the same manner, governments at Westminster refused for decades to allow Wales a Secretary of State on the basis that Wales lacked a jurisdiction. We now have a Secretary of State, and a legislature and government of our own, albeit that a broad competence to legislate has been withheld, once more because of the lack of… a jurisdiction.
Yet, amongst the devious arguments used during the last century and a half, there are clear constitutional principles to be discerned which can provide a firm foundation upon which to ask for a judicial system for Wales. Wales now has its own body of laws, a body which is going to develop and that through the actions of a native legislature and government. As it is necessary for those laws to be administered, and there is no sound reason for them to be administered outside of Wales, the call for a Welsh judicial system has a strong argument based upon a constitutional principle which has already been established.
There is no longer any need to weaken the argument by comparing the position of Wales to that of Scotland – and thereby provide opponents with an excuse to search for distinctions between the two countries, nor any longer any need to rely on national sentiment to justify the call. More important still, one should avoid allowing opponents to shift their ground from questions of principle to questions of finance and practicality. The appropriate time for considering questions of cost and practical issues is after having settled the question of principle. The history of the legal development of contemporary Wales is a very interesting one, and the final chapter has yet to be written. As that chapter is being written, it would be wise to acknowledge that the content of the earlier chapters is not only interesting but also instructive.
1 See National Assembly for Wales: Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee: Inquiry into the establishment of a separate Welsh jurisdiction – December 2011; Consultation responses – March 2012.
2 See Welsh Government: Consultation Document: A Separate Legal Jurisdiction for Wales – Number WG-15109 (27 March 2012).
3 “the only competent judge of the strength and purpose of the Welsh desires for separate judicial arrangements from those of England would, in our opinion, be a Welsh legislature or other legislative authority specially constituted under a scheme of Devolution to represent the people of Wales”. National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 11.
4 “we think that the creation of a Welsh judiciary should be effected if and when the Welsh legislature shall ask for it. It, if so desired, should be a Judiciary equal in independence to that of Scotland, with no appeal save to the House of Lords or its successor as the Supreme Appellate tribunal of the United Kingdom”; National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22
5 Letter (24/2/20) from Sir Claud Schuster to His Honour Judge Rowland Rowlands, “I believe the scheme [for a separate Welsh judicial system] has a powerful backing”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
6 See, Sir John Thomas, “Legal Wales: Its Modern Origins and its Role after Devolution – National Identity, the Welsh Language and Parochialism” in T.G. Watkin (ed.), Legal Wales: Its Past, Its Future (Cardiff, 2001), 113−166.
7 Letter (18/5/44) from Sir Claud Schuster to Sir Alan Barlow: ‘the Scottish and English judicial systems are, except for the appeal to the House of Lords, wholly distinct and separate, and operate a separate jurisprudence founded on different principles with different origins. The English and Welsh system of jurisprudence is a uniform integral whole operating a system of jurisprudence which is uniform, and has regard to the same principles, and springs from the same origins. The substantive law of England and Wales is not similar but the same, except for some minor immaterial differences.’ National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
8 Parl. Deb. (Series 3) vol. 253 (1880) HC 30 June: “were they to have fractional or national legislation? They all highly respected and loved Wales, but, after all, it was but a small part of England” (Edward Warton). “But he did not know that it had been hitherto recognized that Wales should be treated in a different way from other portions of the Kingdom”. (Arthur Peel)
9 Parl. Deb. (Series 3) vol. 260 (1881) HC 4 May: cols. 1772−1775.
10 “Wales should have restored to it the separate judiciary it once had”: Western Mail, Friday, 26 March 1920.
11 Letter from Neville Chamberlain to Morgan Jones MP (27/7/1938): “The analogy of Scotland has been advanced … I think, however, that it must be recognised that the two cases are not parallel. For Scotland has always had different systems of law and administration from those in force in England… Wales, on the other hand, since Henry VII’s (sic) Act of 1535, has been closely incorporated with England and there has not been, and is not now, any distinct law or administrative system calling for the attention of a separate Minister.”: NLW, James Griffiths Papers, C2/1.
12 Memorandum from all 36 MPs from Wales to the Prime Minister, Winston Churchill, (28/10/1943): National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
13 Letter from Winston Churchill to Megan Lloyd George MP 2/1/1945: “Thank you for your letter of November 10 regarding the proposals of the Welsh Parliamentary Party for the establishment of a Secretary of State for Wales. The matter is, as you know, receiving consideration. The difficulty is that a proposal of this nature has such far reaching implications in the administrative sphere that detailed consideration has to be given it by the many authorities concerned. These authorities are of course heavily burdened with war tasks.”: NLW, James Griffiths Papers, C2/5.
14 Letter from J.A. Barlow (Sir Alan Barlow) to Sir Claud Schuster (12/4/44): National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
15 Memorandum from Sir Claud Schuster to Sir Alan Barlow (18/5/44) “It would, however, be unwise wholly to exclude from consideration the fact that there have been signs of agitation in Wales on this subject”: National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
16 In his memorandum (note 15 above), Schuster quoted from the evidence of Ithel Davies according to the Report of the Peel Commission (Cmd. 5065) 20/1/36, p. 371. “if the Welsh language is given its rightful and proper place in the administration of justice in Wales, there must be something like a fundamental reorganization of the judicial system in Wales to meet that measure of recognition”: National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
17 Parl. Deb. (Series 3) vol. 253 (1880) HC., 4 May: “Why should they have one Sunday Closing Bill for Wales, whose population, after all, only formed a small section of the community, but who, following the example of the Irish, fancied themselves a nation, and quite as famous as Ireland, while in point of fact, the Principality was only a small part of England? Wales, certainly, had not produced great men like Ireland” (Edward Warton MP).
18 Parl. Deb. (Series 3) vol. 253 (1880) HC., 15 June “The great fallacy was in trying to set up different little laws all over England, breaking the United Kingdom into sections for the purpose of carrying out the fads and fancies of fanatics.” (Edward Warton MP).
19 Letter from Sir Claud Schuster to James W. Lowther MP (13/2/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507 20 Letter (24/2/20) from Sir Claud Schuster to His Honour Judge Rowland Rowlands, “no doubt, within limits, the proposed change is desirable, but I have an idea that some of the proposals to be put forward – particularly those dealing with appeals etc. – are too extreme, at any rate for the present”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
21 Letter from Judge R. Rowlands to Sir Claud Schuster (29/2/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
22 Letter (1/3/20) from Sir Claud Schuster to His Honour Judge R. Rowlands: “what it is beyond vague national sentiment which really actuates those who wish for a severance between Wales and England in these matters”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
23 Letter from Sir Claud Schuster to B.J. Bridgeman (4/3/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
24 Letter from Judge R. Rowlands to Sir Claud Schuster (10/3/20): “National sentiment is no doubt largely responsible for the desire for complete severance between England and Wales – Many Welshmen demand for Wales the same position as that occupied by Scotland or Ireland. There are also practical objections to the present system”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
25 Letter from Sir Claud Schuster to Sir John Sankey (8/3/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
26 Letter from Sir Claud Schuster (9/3/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
27 Memorandum amongst the papers in National Archives, LCO 2/507.
28 Letter from Sir Claud Schuster to Huw Edwards MP (26/4/20): “I do not think there is the smallest possibility that any Judge or Lord Justice who now holds office in the Supreme Court would abandon that office in order to have a place in a separate Welsh judiciary.”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
29 “We recommend that any Devolution Statute should contain a clause providing in express terms that Wales may have a separate Judiciary and all needful accessory judicial institutions on application to the United Kingdom parliament by the Welsh Legislature.”: National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22
30 “There is a danger of throwing all this away to satisfy the insatiable demands of those who wish to have greater and greater devolution… There have always been only a few judges from Wales who were good enough for the High Court and Court of Appeal… There is just not the talent … as Wales is a small country… a separate jurisdiction would mean the continuation of the downward slope to separation and the break-up of the UK.” See National Assembly for Wales: Constitutional and Legislative Affairs Committee: Inquiry into the establishment of a separate Welsh jurisdiction – Consultation responses – March 2012: Evidence of Dr. Peter Freeman, CLA WJ 1.
31 “Some of the arguments for and against Scottish independence are aimed at the heart… If Scots really want independence for political or cultural reasons, they should go for it. National pride is impossible to price. But if they vote for independence they should do so in the knowledge that their country could end up as one of Europe’s vulnerable, marginal economies. In the 18th century, Edinburgh’s fine architecture and its Enlightenment role earned it the nickname “Athens of the North”. It would be a shame if that name became apt again for less positive reasons.” The Economist, 14−20 April 2012.
32 Judicature Acts 1873−75.
33 Government of Wales Act 2006, Explanatory Notes, ¶¶ 333, 334b): “in order to be within the Assembly’s legislative competence… the provision in question must apply only in relation to Wales”; ¶ 338b): “the provision in question may not “extend” to any jurisdiction other than England and Wales. (England and Wales is a single legal jurisdiction and Assembly Measures will form part of the law of that jurisdiction. Although they will only… apply to Wales”. See also ¶¶ 404 a 405b) repeating the doctrine in relation to Assembly Acts.
34 “we think that the creation of a Welsh judiciary should be effected if and when the Welsh legislature shall ask for it.”; National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22
35 “We recommend that any Devolution Statute should contain a clause providing in express terms that Wales may have a separate Judiciary and all needful accessory judicial institutions on application to the United Kingdom parliament by the Welsh Legislature.”: National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22.
36 Primary Legislative Competence of the Assembly – Commentary, written evidence presented by the Secretary of State for Wales and the First Minister of Wales to the Welsh Affairs Committee of the House of Commons, Appendix 2, 10 November 2005, ¶ 1:
“When defining the subjects on which the Assembly will be able, subject to a “yes” vote in a referendum, to exercise primary legislative powers there are two broad options:
(a) to specify the subjects on which the Assembly may legislate (this is the model adopted in relation to Scotland in the Scotland Act 1978, which never came into force);
(b) to provide that the Assembly may legislate on anything unless it is specifically reserved to the UK Parliament and then to specify those reserved matters (which is the model adopted in relation to Scotland by the Scotland Act 1998
37 Appendix 2, n. 36 above, ¶ 3–4:
Under the approach of the Scotland Act 1998 changes to the law which are made by the Scottish Parliament are not limited to specific subjects. They can include changes to basic principles of law.
Scotland has its own distinct legal jurisdiction, with its own system of courts, judges, legal profession and provision for legal education. An ability on the part of its legislature to change basic principles of law and specific rules relating to subjects such as land law which have a general impact across almost all day-to-day activities is consistent with this situation.
38 Appendix 2, n. 36 above, ¶ 7:
If the Assembly had the same general power to legislate as the Scottish Parliament then the consequences for the unity of the England and Wales legal jurisdiction would be considerable. The courts would, as time went by, be increasingly called upon to apply fundamentally different basic principles of law and rules of law of general application which were different in Wales from those which applied in England. The practical consequence would be the need for different systems of legal education, different sets of judges and lawyers and different courts. England and Wales would become separate legal jurisdictions.
39 See, for example, Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v Morts Dock & Engineering Co. The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388, a case before the Privy Council from Australia with Lords Simonds, Reid, Morris of Borth-y-Gest, Radcliffe and Tucker as judges. The Privy Council decided to recommend to Her Majesty that the defendant’s appeal be allowed albeit that Kinsella J in the High Court ([1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 575) and three appeal judges in the Supreme Court ([1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 697) in New South Wales had decided unanimously in favour of the plaintiff.
40 See, for example, (M’Alister or) Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, where the judges from England and Wales, Lords Buckmaster and Tomlin, would have decided the case against the opinion of the two judges from Scotland, Lords Macmillan and Thankerton, were it not that Lord Atkin had supported the view of the Scottish judges.
Dadleuon dichellgar a datganoli: Hanes yr Ymgyrch dros Awdurdodaeth Gymreig
Darlith yr Eisteddfod
Eisteddfod Genedlaethol Bro Morgannwg
Thomas Glyn Watkin
Gadewch imi ddechrau drwy ddiolch i’r Sefydliad Materion Cymreig am ei wahoddiad caredig i draddodi ei ddarlith flynyddol yma yn yr Eisteddfod eleni. Mae’n anrhydedd i mi yn bersonol, a hefyd yn gyfle i gyfranogi o ddadl sy’n bwysig ar hyn o bryd ym mywyd y genedl.
Flwyddyn yn ôl, cefais y fraint o gyfranogi o sgwrs ar faes yr Eisteddfod ynglŷn ag awdurdodaeth i Gymru, sgwrs a oedd wedi ei threfnu gan Gymdeithas y Cyfreithwyr. Yn y cyfamser mae Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol y Cynulliad Cenedlaethol wedi cynnal ymchwiliad i’r cwestiwn,1 ac y mae Llywodraeth Cymru hithau wedi lansio ymgynghoriad ar yr union bwnc.2 Braf oedd gweld y nifer helaeth o ymatebion a gafodd eu derbyn gan y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a gweld bod cymaint o ddiddordeb bellach ym mhynciau cyfansoddiadol ymhlith y Cymry. Bydd yn ddiddorol gweld beth fydd canlyniadau’r holl waith sydd ar y gweill ar hyn o bryd.
Nid hwn, fodd bynnag, yw’r tro cyntaf i gyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân i Gymru gael ei thrafod, ac y mae’r cysyniad o awdurdodaeth wedi bod yn bwysig mewn nifer o ddadleuon ynglŷn â sefyllfa gyfreithiol Cymru fwy nag unwaith. Yn sgil y Rhyfel Byd Cyntaf, a map gwleidyddol Ewrop yn cael ei ail-lunio, a hyd yn oed map gwleidyddol Ynysoedd Prydain yn cael ei ailstrwythuro wrth i Weriniaeth Iwerddon ymadael â’r Deyrnas Unedig, fe gododd y cwestiwn hwn: a ddylai pob rhan o’r hyn oedd ar ôl o’r Deyrnas Unedig gael ei chyfundrefn farnwrol ei hun, hynny yw, gwahanol awdurdodaethau i Ogledd Iwerddon, yr Alban, ac i Gymru a Lloegr fel gwledydd ar wahân?
Yn ystod trafodaethau Cynhadledd y Llefarydd, sefydlwyd is-bwyllgor o dan yr Arglwydd Stuart o Wortley i ystyried y pwnc arbennig hwn. Yn y pen draw, ni chafwyd ateb bendant i’r cwestiwn, ond ymhlith yr argymhellion a ystyriwyd, awgrymodd yr is-bwyllgor fod cwestiwn cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân i Gymru yn un a ddylai gael ei ateb gan ddeddfwrfa Gymreig, pryd bynnag y byddai un yn bodoli.3 O safbwynt 1920, mae hyn yn edrych yn debyg iawn i gic eithriadol am yr ystlys, ond yn awr, wrth gwrs, mae’r bêl yn ôl ar y cae, ac mae’n ddiddorol cofio bod yr adroddiad yn 20au’r ganrif ddiwethaf wedi mynd ymlaen i ddweud y dylai unrhyw statud datganoli yn y dyfodol gynnwys cymal yn datgan yn glir y dylai Senedd San Steffan ddeddfu i roi cyfundrefn farnwrol i Gymru pryd bynnag y gofynnai deddfwrfa Gymreig amdani.4
Ar y pryd, yr oedd tipyn o gefnogaeth ymhlith cyfreithwyr y genedl i’r syniad o gyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân i Gymru, yn enwedig ymhlith barnwyr a bargyfreithwyr yn y De.5 Mae’n wir hefyd fod rhai o swyddogion y llywodraeth Brydeinig yn Llundain wedi dadlau’n gryf i’r gwrthwyneb, gan gynnwys Syr Claud Schuster, Ysgrifennydd Parhaol Swyddfa’r Arglwydd Ganghellor.6 Yr oedd Schuster wedi cael ei benodi i’w swydd yn ifanc iawn, yn ei ddeugeiniau, ac fe arhosodd yn y swydd am dros chwarter canrif. O ganlyniad, cafodd gryn ddylanwad fel gwas sifil, ac fwy nag unwaith defnyddiodd ei ddylanwad i wrthwynebu datblygiadau cyfreithiol i Gymru.
Ei ddadl ym 1920 oedd nad oedd yn bosibl i Gymru gael cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân i Loegr oherwydd nad oedd gan Gymru ei chyfreithiau ei hun. Nid oedd corff o gyfraith Gymreig yn bodoli yn yr un modd ag yr oedd corff gwahanol o gyfraith yn bodoli yn yr Alban a Gogledd Iwerddon. Defnyddiodd yr un ddadl tua chwarter canrif yn ddiweddarach wrth drafod gyda’i gyd-weision sifil gwestiwn Ysgrifennydd Gwladol i Gymru,7 a gellir gweld i ryw raddau ddylanwad Schuster ar yr adroddiad ym 1920 wrth ystyried y cysylltiad yn yr argymhellion rhwng yr achos dros gyfundrefn farnwrol a bodolaeth deddfwrfa Gymreig, hynny yw sefydliad gyda phwerau i greu corff o gyfreithiau Cymreig.
Y mae’r ddadl yn un ddiddorol, oherwydd y mae’n gwneud cysylltiad clir rhwng y syniad o awdurdodaeth a chorff o gyfraith, ond hefyd y mae’r ddadl yn rhyfedd wrth ystyried hanes cyfreithiol Cymru yn y genhedlaeth gynt. Oherwydd yr oedd yna reswm am gefnogaeth barnwyr a bargyfreithwyr y De i’r syniad o gyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân, rheswm yn deillio o’r hyn a ddigwyddodd ddeugain mlynedd yn gynharach wrth i Senedd San Steffan ddeddfu i Gymru ar wahân i Loegr am y tro cyntaf. Y ddeddf oedd y Ddeddf Cau ar y Sul (Cymru), [Sunday Closing (Wales) Act] 1881.
Wrth i’r ddeddfwriaeth arfaethedig gael ei thrafod yn Nhŷ’r Cyffredin ym 1880 a 1881, ymhlith ei gwrthwynebwyr yr oedd yr Aelod Seneddol Ceidwadol dros Bridport, Edward Warton. O ran egwyddor, ei ddadl oedd nad oedd yn bosibl deddfu i Gymru ar wahân i Loegr oherwydd yr oedd Cymru a Lloegr yn un – un diriogaeth integredig yn cael ei gwasanaethu gan un gyfundrefn farnwrol. Gan nad oedd cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân gan Gymru, nid oedd yn bosibl deddfu ar ei chyfer. Nid oedd Cymru yn awdurdodaeth, felly nid oedd yn bosibl iddi gael corff o gyfreithiau.8
Ni fu’r ddadl yn llwyddiannus – fe ddaeth y Prif Weinidog ei hun, William Gladstone, i’r Tŷ i gefnogi’r Bil,9 ond mae’n amlwg bod y ddadl wedi cael effaith ar yr aelodau o Gymru ac ar gyfreithwyr Cymru wrth iddynt hwy ystyried a chofio bod Cymru wedi meddu ar ei llysoedd barn ei hun hyd at 1830 – Llysoedd y Sesiwn Fawr – ac os oedd angen cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân ar Gymru er mwyn ennill ei deddfau ei hun, efallai bryd hynny yr oedd yn amser i’w hailennill.10
Felly, yn 80au’r bedwaredd ganrif ar bymtheg, y ddadl oedd nad oedd yn bosibl i Gymru feddu ar ei chyfreithiau ei hun gan nad oedd ganddi hi ei llysoedd barn ei hun, a ddeugain mlynedd yn ddiweddarach yr ateb i’r deisyfiad am lysoedd barn Cymreig oedd nad oedd hynny’n bosibl oherwydd nad oedd gan Gymru ei chyfreithiau ei hun. Naill ai mae elfen gylchog yn y ddadl, neu – ac yn bwysig iawn o ran y sefyllfa sydd ohoni – nid yw’n bosibl cael y naill heb y llall, hynny yw – eto gan adlewyrchu argymhellion adroddiad 1920 – mae corff o gyfreithiau ar wahân yn galw am gyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân.
Yr wyf wedi osgoi hyd yn hyn lawer o ddefnydd o’r gair awdurdodaeth – a hynny am reswm. Mae yna fwy nag un ystyr i’r gair, ac y mae hynny wedi caniatáu i’r gair gael ei ddefnyddio mewn modd ystwyth weithiau sydd yn cuddio natur gylchog rhai o’r dadleuon yn erbyn datblygiadau cyfreithiol ar gyfer Cymru. Gall awdurdodaeth olygu ‘tiriogaeth a chanddi ei chyfreithiau ei hun’; hefyd gall olygu ‘tiriogaeth a chanddi ei chyfundrefn farnwrol ei hun’. O ganlyniad, gellir dweud – fel yn y 1880au – na all Cymru gael ei deddfwriaeth ei hun oherwydd nad yw Cymru’n awdurdodaeth, a hefyd, fel ym 1920, na all Cymru gael ei chyfundrefn farnwrol ei hun oherwydd nad yw Cymru’n awdurdodaeth.
Mae’r ffaith bod y gair yn gallu cael ei ddefnyddio mewn mwy nag un ystyr yn caniatáu iddo gael ei ddefnyddio mewn modd sydd yn arwynebol gyson, ond mewn gwirionedd y mae’r cysondeb nid yn unig yn arwynebol ond yn ffug – ac y mae hynny wedi caniatáu iddo gael ei ddefnyddio mewn modd eithaf dichellgar o bryd i’w gilydd er mwyn cyfiawnhau gwrthod i Gymru ddatblygiadau cyfreithiol a ganiatawyd, er enghraifft, i’r Alban.
Ac yn anffodus, yn y degawdau a ddilynodd, cafodd yr Alban ei defnyddio fel llinyn mesur bron bob tro y cafodd cwestiwn ei godi ynglŷn â darpariaeth gyfreithiol wahanol i Gymru. Ar ddiwedd y 30au, ychydig cyn yr Ail Ryfel Byd, gwrthododd y Llywodraeth ganiatáu i Gymru gael Ysgrifennydd Gwladol yn yr un modd ag yr oedd gan yr Alban. Yn sgil cynnydd sylweddol yn y ddarpariaeth arbennig ar gyfer yr Alban, ateb y Prif Weinidog, Neville Chamberlain, oedd bod cymharu Cymru â’r Alban yn amherthnasol, oherwydd bod gan yr Alban gyfundrefnau cyfreithiol a gweinyddol hyd yn oed cyn i Swyddfa’r Alban gael ei chreu. Yr oedd Cymru ar y llaw arall wedi cael ei hymgorffori â Lloegr yn yr unfed ganrif ar bymtheg heb unrhyw gyfraith na chyfundrefn weinyddol a oedd yn haeddu sylw gweinidog arbennig.11 Mae’n amlwg bod cymharu Cymru â’r Alban yn arwain at gymhariaeth anffafriol ar y sail bod yr Alban eisoes yn awdurdodaeth ar wahân.
Ar ddiwedd yr Ail Ryfel Byd, gofynnodd holl Aelodau Seneddol Cymru, gyda chymeradwyaeth rhai aelodau Cymreig yn Nhŷ’r Arglwyddi, am i’r cwestiwn o Ysgrifennydd Gwladol i Gymru gael ei ystyried unwaith eto.12 Plediodd y Prif Weinidog, Winston Churchill, fod y Llywodraeth yn rhy brysur gyda materion eraill i ystyried pwnc a oedd mor gymhleth – ateb eithaf teg mewn ffordd ar ddiwedd rhyfel byd.13 Er gwaethaf hynny, yr oedd amser gan un o’r gweision sifil mwyaf ddylanwadol, Syr Alan Barlow, i ysgrifennu at Syr Claud Schuster yn Swyddfa’r Arglwydd Ganghellor i dynnu ei sylw at y cais.14 Ei ofn oedd bod cyfartaledd â’r Alban yn golygu cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân, gan nodi bod sylwedd cyfraith yr Alban, ac nid yn unig y modd o’i gweinyddu, yn wahanol i’r hyn a oedd yn bodoli yn Lloegr, rhywbeth nad oedd yn wir am Gymru.
Yn ei ateb, cyfaddefodd Schuster nad oedd llawer o bwerau gan Ysgrifennydd Gwladol yr Alban ynglŷn â gweinyddu cyfiawnder ar wahân i benodi ynadon, ond er gwaethaf hynny awgrymodd y buasai’n ddoeth cadw cwestiwn awdurdodaeth ar wahân dan sylw oherwydd yr oedd yng Nghymru hanes o’r hyn a ddisgrifiodd fel agitation ynglŷn â’r pwnc.15 Efallai yr oedd yn cofio teimladau cryf cyfreithwyr y De ar ôl y Rhyfel Byd Cyntaf, ond yn eglur yr oedd yn anhapus ynglŷn â’r hyn a ddywedwyd gan Ithel Davies yn y 30au i’r perwyl y buasai angen aildrefnu cyfundrefn farnwrol Cymru yn sylfaenol pe caniateid i’r iaith Gymraeg le cyfiawn a phriodol wrth weinyddu cyfiawnder yng Nghymru,16 geiriau a gafodd eu cyhoeddi cyn i Ddeddf Llysoedd Cymru gael ei phasio yn 1942.
Mae’n eithaf amlwg y tro hwn fod y gweision sifil yn chwilio am resymau i wrthod datblygiad cyfreithiol i Gymru, ac yr oedd cymharu Cymru’r â’r Alban yn rhoi cyfle iddynt ddefnyddio’r cysyniad ystwyth o awdurdodaeth fel esgus neu reswm cyfleus i wrthod. Yr oedd perygl wrth gymharu Cymru â’r Alban, ac mae’r perygl hwnnw’n parhau, ac nid hwn yw’r unig fath o ddadl sydd yn beryglus i’w defnyddio.
Yr oedd y ddadl yn erbyn deddfu ar wahân i Gymru oherwydd nad oedd gan Gymru gyfundrefn farnwrol, a’r ddadl nad oedd yn bosibl creu cyfundrefn farnwrol i Gymru oherwydd nad oedd ganddi gyfreithiau gwahanol, y ddwy ohonynt – er gwaethaf natur gylchog y rhesymeg – o leiaf yn ddadlau ar sail egwyddorion cyfansoddiadol. Nid ar sail egwyddor yn unig y dadleuodd y gwrthwynebwyr. O bryd i’w gilydd, cafodd y syniad o ddarpariaeth gyfreithiol Gymreig ei watwar, efallai er mwyn gwylltio’r cefnogwyr a’u hysgogi i gyfaddef mai cenedlaetholdeb oedd prif sail eu gofynion. Ym 1880 a 1881, dadleuodd Edward Warton AS yn ffyrnig yn erbyn deddfwriaeth arbennig i Gymru gan ddweud mai dim ond rhan fach o Loegr oedd Cymru, er bod rhai bobl yn tybio bod Cymru yn rhyw fath o genedl er nad oedd erioed wedi cynhyrchu mawrion o’r un fath ag Iwerddon.17Yn y pen draw, yr oedd y bwriad i ddeddfu i Gymru ar wahân i Loegr yn arwydd o wendid yn llygaid Edward Warton, gwendid oedd yn ildio i ddymuniadau eithafwyr – “the fads and fancies of fanatics”.18
Mae’n amlwg bod teimladau cryf ar waith ar y ddwy ochr yn ystod dadleuon 80au’r bedwaredd ganrif ar bymtheg. Ni ellir gorbrisio gyfraniad Gladstone ac yntau’n Brif Weinidog, i lwyddiant y Bil. Yr oedd egwyddor deddfwriaeth ar wahân i Gymru yn un bwysig i’r Rhyddfrydwyr ac i Gladstone ei hun, oherwydd yn y dyfodol byddai’r Ddeddf yn sail i ddeddfwriaeth i ddatgysylltu Eglwys Loegr yng Nghymru. Ni ddigwyddodd hynny tan ychydig cyn y Rhyfel Byd Cyntaf, gyda Chymro, David Lloyd George, yn un o hoelionwyth y Llywodraeth Ryddfrydol.
Yng nghyfnod Lloyd George fel Prif Weinidog, wrth gwrs, cafodd cwestiwn awdurdodaeth ar wahân i Gymru ei ystyried fel rhan o waith Cynhadledd y Llefarydd ym 1920. Prif Weinidog clymblaid oedd Lloyd George erbyn hynny a’r Arglwydd Ganghellor yn ei lywodraeth oedd Arglwydd Birkenhead, F.E. Smith, cyn Aelod Seneddol Ceidwadol ac un o wrthwynebwyr mwyaf Lloyd George adeg ei gyllideb wir chwyldroadol ym 1909, a hefyd yn ystod yr ymgyrch i basio’r ddeddfwriaeth a ddatgysylltodd yr Eglwys yng Nghymru.
Ac yntau’n Ysgrifennydd Parhaol ar adran o’r llywodraeth, gydag F.E. Smith wrth y llyw, fe benderfynodd Syr Claud Schuster ymyrryd yng ngwaith is-bwyllgor Cynhadledd y Llefarydd a oedd yn ystyried cyfundrefn farnwrol i Gymru ym 1920. Mae’n anodd credu nad oedd y teimladau cryf a fynegodd F.E. Smith yn ystod y ddadl ar Fil yr Eglwys Gymreig ar waith unwaith eto y tu ôl i’r llenni pan ysgrifennodd Schuster at y Llefarydd, James Lowther, ym mis Chwefror 1920 i ddweud bod yr Arglwydd Ganghellor yn dymuno i Schuster roi tystiolaeth gerbron yr is-bwyllgor.19 Rhaid cofio bod yr ohebiaeth hon yn digwydd yn yr wythnosau olaf cyn i Ddeddf yr Eglwys yng Nghymru ddod i rym ar ddiwedd mis Mawrth 1920.
Ddeng niwrnod ar ôl ysgrifennu at y Llefarydd, ysgrifennodd Schuster lythyr at un o farnwr y Llysoedd Sirol yn y De, sef Ei Anrhydedd y Barnwr Rowland Rowlands. Yn ei lythyr, dywedodd Schuster ei fod yn deall bod yna gryn dipyn o gefnogaeth i’r syniad o gyfundrefn farnwrol wahanol i Gymru, gan gyfaddef bod y syniad i ryw raddau i’w ddymuno, ond hefyd yn cyfaddef ei bryder bod rhai o’r cynigion yn rhy eithafol, er enghraifft, Llys Apêl ar wahân.20 Mae’n debyg mai ‘pysgota’ oedd Schuster yn ei lythyr i ddarganfod beth oedd cryfder y gefnogaeth am awdurdodaeth ar wahân i Gymru a beth oedd cynnwys y cynigion y byddai’r cefnogwyr yn cyflwyno i’r Is-bwyllgor. Atebodd y Barnwr Rowlands yn ddiffuant drwy roi disgrifiad trylwyr o’r hyn yr oedd nifer o’i gyd-gyfreithwyr yn dymuno ei weld.21
Yn syth ar ôl derbyn ateb Rowlands, mae newid agwedd yn iaith Schuster. Atebodd lythyr Rowlands ar unwaith, ateb gyda’r dyddiad 1 Mawrth 1920, gan ofyn beth oedd ar waith yn achosi’r fath ofynion, ar wahân i ryw deimlad cenedlaethol niwlog – ‘vague national sentiment’, a dechrau dadlau nad oedd digon o fusnes gerbron llysoedd sifil Cymru i gyfiawnhau’r fath ddatblygiad.22 Heb aros am ateb Rowlands, gofynnodd i B.J. Bridgeman gynnal ymchwil i gost llysoedd sirol Cymru a maint y ffioedd yr oeddent yn eu codi.23 Mae’n debyg bod Schuster wedi cysylltu â Rowlands yn fwriadol er mwyn darganfod cryfder a natur y ddadl o blaid awdurdodaeth i Gymru er mwyn paratoi’r achos yn erbyn y fath ddatblygiad gerbron yr Is-bwyllgor.
Mae’r modd yr ysgrifennodd at Rowlands ym mis Chwefror mor wahanol i’r modd a ysgrifennodd ar ddydd Gŵyl Dewi ar ôl derbyn yr wybodaeth yr oedd ei heisiau arno yn dangos mwy nag elfen o ddichell, yn enwedig wrth ystyried pa mor gyflym oedd ei ymateb pendant yn erbyn y cynllun unwaith yr oedd yr wybodaeth yn ei ddwylo. Mae’n amlwg hefyd bod Rowlands wedi deall y sefyllfa, oherwydd wrth iddo ef ymateb wythnos yn ddiweddarach, y mae’n gwadu mai teimladau cenedlaethol yn unig oedd tu ôl i’r ymgyrch am awdurdodaeth i Gymru gan restru materion ymarferol a oedd yn cefnogi datblygiad o’r fath.24 Yn anffodus, symudodd hyn y ddadl at faterion ymarferol, yn gwmws yn ôl dymuniadau Schuster.
Pan ofynnodd Syr John Sankey, un o farnwyr yr Uchel Lys ar y pryd, am gael cyfarfod ag F.E. Smith, mynnodd Schuster fod Sankey yn cyfarfod ag ef, Schuster, hefyd.25 Sicrhaodd ei fod ef yn derbyn copi o’r dystiolaeth yr oedd yr Arglwydd Ustus Bankes wedi ei rhoi i’r Is-bwyllgor yn ystod mis Chwefror.26 Mae’n ddiddorol cofio mai Sankey a Bankes oedd dau o’r tri ‘doethion’ – y trydydd oedd yr Arglwydd Ustus Atkin − a luniodd Gyfansoddiad i’r Eglwys yng Nghymru yn ystod y cyfnod hwn, cyfansoddiad a oedd yn cynnwys darpariaeth gynhwysfawr ar gyfer cyfundrefn o lysoedd i wasanaethu’r Eglwys ar ôl datgysylltu.
Ymateb Adran yr Arglwydd Ganghellor felly i’r cais am awdurdodaeth i Gymru oedd gwatwar y syniad fel un a oedd yn seiliedig ar ‘deimladau cenedlaethol niwlog’ a chasglu gwybodaeth er mwyn dangos bod y syniad yn un anfforddiadwy. Yn yr un modd ag yr oedd Edward Warton AS wedi gwatwar safon deallusion Cymru ddeugain mlynedd ynghynt, cwestiynodd Schuster a fyddai’n bosibl i Gymru gynhyrchu olyniaeth o wŷr talentog i fod yn fargyfreithwyr gerbron llysoedd Cymru ac i wasanaethu fel barnwyr ynddynt.27 Awgrymodd y byddai’r cyfreithwyr mwyaf talentog yn parhau i symud i Lundain, ac na fuasai pobl llwyddiannus o’r fath yn fodlon symud yn ôl i weithio yng Nghymru.28
Ychydig sylw a gafodd unrhyw gysyniad cyfansoddiadol gan Adran yr Arglwydd Ganghellor, er gwaethaf eu barn cadarn nad oedd yn bosibl creu cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân ar gyfer tiriogaeth nad oedd yn meddu ar ei chyfreithiau ei hun. Dyna’r elfen wrth gwrs sydd wedi newid ers 1920. Yn y cyfamser dadbrofwyd y syniad bod y gwahaniaeth rhwng sefyllfa Cymru a sefyllfa’r Alban o ran eu cyfreithiau yn golygu nad yw’n bosibl i Gymru gael elfennau o awdurdodaeth ar wahân. Er nad oedd gan Gymru ei chyfundrefn farnwrol ei hun na chorff o’i chyfreithiau ei hun, fe gafodd Ysgrifennydd Gwladol ym 1964 a bellach wrth gwrs y mae gan y genedl y ddeddfwrfa Gymreig y dywedodd Cynhadledd y Llefarydd ym 1920 y dylai feddu ar yr hawl i ofyn am gyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân hefyd.29
Er bod hynny’n wir, byddai’n ffôl credu bod y dadleuon a oedd yn seiliedig ar y gwahaniaethau hynny wedi llwyr ddiflannu. Maent naill ai yn parhau i fodoli neu wedi eu trawsnewid i ffitio’r sefyllfa newydd. Ym 1880, dadl Edward Warton AS oedd bod Cymru yn rhy fach i fod yn awdurdodaeth, bod ei chyfundrefn gyfreithiol yn un â Lloegr, nad oedd ganddi wŷr talentog a dim ond eithafwyr oedd yn dymuno gweld datblygiadau a oedd yn gwahanu’r ddwy genedl. Y mae’r union syniadau i’w gweld yn y dystiolaeth a gafwyd ac a gyhoeddwyd gan Bwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol y Cynulliad eleni, er nad yw’r iaith mor ffyrnig.30 Hyd yn oed mewn cylchgronau parchus fel yr Economist, wrth i’r cwestiwn o annibyniaeth ar gyfer yr Alban gael ei drafod yn gynharach eleni, fe gododd y bwgan mai teimladau cenedlaethol niwlog a oedd ar waith ac yn bygwth trechu egwyddorion ymarferol llawer mwy pwysig.31
Heb os nac oni bai, ac er gwaethaf y ffaith bod deddfwrfa bellach gan Gymru, ac o ganlyniad fod corff o gyfreithiau Cymreig yn datblygu, bydd gwrthwynebiadau cyllidol ac ymarferol Syr Claud Schuster yn parhau i gael eu defnyddio i wadu bod cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân yn bosibilrwydd o ddifrif. Ar ôl dweud hynny, mae yna wahaniaeth pwysig rhwng cyd-destun y ddadl ar ddechrau’r 20au â’r sefyllfa bresennol. Ym 1920, dim ond ar gyfer swyddogion y llywodraeth, y gweision sifil, yr oedd y manylion perthnasol ynglŷn â’r sefyllfa gyllidol ar gael; heddiw, yn rhinwedd datblygiadau fel y Ddeddf Rhyddid Gwybodaeth, mae o leiaf gyfle i gefnogwyr awdurdodaeth i Gymru feddu ar yr un wybodaeth os ydynt yn manteisio ar y cyfle.
Cryfder y ddadl o blaid awdurdodaeth ar wahân i Gymru ar hyn o bryd yw’r ffaith y gellir bellach ei seilio ar egwyddorion cyfansoddiadol a chyfreithiol sydd wedi cael eu derbyn yn y gorffennol gan sefydliadau’r Deyrnas Unedig. Ffolineb felly, yn fy marn i, fyddai, ymadael â thir cadarn egwyddor er mwyn defnyddio dadleuon a all gael eu gwatwar fel teimladau niwlog neu eu gwrthwynebu ar sail cost neu ymarferoldeb. Dyma’r cwestiwn: a oes yna achos ar gyfer awdurdodaeth Gymreig, ac ni ddylai’r cwestiwn hwnnw gael ei ateb yn nhermau cyllid na phethau ymarferol, ond ar sail gyfansoddiadol.
Mae gan Gymru gorff o gyfreithiau ac mae’n rhaid iddynt gael eu gweinyddu. Mae’r corff o gyfreithiau hwnnw bellach yn cynnwys cyfreithiau sydd yn cael eu gwneud gan ddeddfwrfa Gymreig, a gweinidogion Cymreig sydd yn deddfu yn ddwyieithog. Felly, a ddylai llysoedd y tu allan i Gymru – lle nad yw cyfreithiau Cymreig yn gymwys, lle nad yw’r Gymraeg yn iaith swyddogol a lle nad oes hawl i ddefnyddio’r Gymraeg gerbron y llysoedd – a ddylai’r llysoedd hynny fod yn gymwys i weithredu cyfreithiau sydd yn gymwys yng Nghymru yn unig?
Mae’n bwysig cofio mai yn 70au’r bedwaredd ganrif ar bymtheg y cafodd cyfundrefn farnwrol bresennol Cymru a Lloegr ei chreu er mwyn adlewyrchu’r gyfundrefn gyfreithiol oedd yn bodoli bryd hynny.32 Pe bai cyfundrefnau barnwrol yn cael eu llunio heddiw ar gyfer Cymru a Lloegr, anodd credu y buasai’r penderfyniad o blaid un gyfundrefn ar gyfer y ddwy wlad, yn lle darpariaethau a fyddai’n adlewyrchu sefyllfa gyfreithiol bresennol y ddwy wlad.
Ar ôl ateb y cwestiynau cyfansoddiadol hynny ar sail egwyddor y dylai cwestiynau cost ac ymarferoldeb gael eu hystyried, nid fel ffordd o ateb y cwestiynau cyfansoddiadol eu hunain. Mae’n bwysig bod cefnogwyr awdurdodaeth i Gymru yn sicrhau nad yw’r ddadl yn cael ei symud o dir cadarn y cwestiwn cyfansoddiadol at dywod symudol cyllid a phethau ymarferol.
Hefyd mae angen sicrhau nad yw’r egwyddorion cyfansoddiadol yn cael eu trawsnewid yn ystod y ddadl. Cymerwch ddadl aflwyddiannus Edward Warton AS ar ddechrau’r 1880au na ellid deddfu ar gyfer Cymru ar wahân i Loegr oherwydd nad oedd Cymru yn awdurdodaeth yn yr ystyr o fod yn diriogaeth â’i chyfundrefn farnwrol ei hun. Er bod Senedd y Deyrnas Unedig ers hynny wedi deddfu’n eithaf aml i Gymru ar wahân i Loegr, eto mae olion o’r ddadl yn parhau. Heddiw, y mae corff o gyfreithiau Cymreig yn datblygu, cyfreithiau sydd yn gymwys yng Nghymru yn unig, ond, er gwaethaf hynny, y mae’r holl gyfreithiau hynny’n ymestyn neu’n rhychwantu dros Gymru a Lloegr. Paham? Oherwydd yn ôl yr athrawiaeth gyfreithiol a dderbynnir, mae’n rhaid i rychwant cyfreithiau gyd-fynd â ffiniau’r awdurdodaeth.33
Ystyriwch hefyd y ddadl a fynnodd nad oedd yn bosibl cael cyfundrefn farnwrol Gymreig heb fod corff o gyfreithiau Cymreig yn bodoli. Bellach, mae gennym gyfreithiau Cymreig, ond eto mae’r ddadl yn dal i gylchredeg, ond yn awr ar ffurf sydd wedi ei thrawsnewid sy’n mynnu bod angen corff digonol o gyfreithiau. Mae’r datblygiad hwn ar y ddadl yn ddiddorol iawn, oherwydd nid yn unig y mae’r pyst yn cael eu symud, ond y mae natur sgorio gôl hefyd yn newid, oblegid mae’r cwestiwn “A oes gan Gymru ei chyfreithiau ei hun?” yn gallu cael ei ateb ‘Oes’ neu ‘Nac Oes’, ond gall yr ateb i’r cwestiwn “A oes gan Gymru ddigon o’i chyfreithiau ei hun i gyfiawnhau awdurdodaeth ar wahân?” amrywio yn ôl barn yr atebwr.
Wrth reswm, ni ellir dadlau o ddifrif bod nifer bach o gyfreithiau gwahanol yn cyfiawnhau creu cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân, ac mewn gwirionedd union yr un peth yw’r cwestiwn ynghylch digonedd nifer y cyfreithiau â’r cwestiwn sy’n gofyn a oes yna gorff o gyfreithiau yn bodoli. Eto, ar sail egwyddor, mae’n rhaid gofyn, pwy felly sydd yn meddu ar yr hawl i ateb y math hwnnw o gwestiwn a phenderfynu a oes yna ddigon o gyfreithiau Cymreig bellach i gyfiawnhau cyfundrefn farnwrol Gymreig? Yn ôl rhai o’r argymhellion a ystyriwyd gan Gynhadledd y Llefarydd ym 1920, deddfwrfa Gymreig a ddylai ateb y fath gwestiwn ac fe ddylai Senedd y Deyrnas Unedig dderbyn ei hateb a gweithredu i greu cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân.34 Yn y pen draw, mater o egwyddor gyfansoddiadol sydd yma eto, sef cynrychiolwyr pobl Cymru a ddylai benderfynu’r cwestiwn yn ôl eu barn hwy mewn modd sydd yn atebol i’r bobl a’u hetholasant.
Awgrymodd Cynhadledd y Llefarydd y dylai unrhyw ddeddf ddatganoli a fyddai’n creu deddfwrfa Gymreig gynnwys cymal yn datgan yn eglur y dylai Cymru gael ei chyfundrefn farnwrol ei hun unwaith y byddai deddfwrfa Gymreig yn gofyn amdani.35 Yn anffodus, wrth gwrs, nid oes cymal o’r fath yn y statudau datganoli. Ond, unwaith eto, yr oedd y cysyniad o awdurdodaeth ar waith wrth i’r deddfau datganoli gael eu llunio, yn enwedig Deddf Llywodraeth(u) Cymru 2006. Yr ydym eisoes wedi nodi bod y gwahaniaeth rhwng cymhwystra a rhychwant cyfreithiau Cymreig yn deillio o’r syniad mai dim ond un awdurdodaeth sydd yn bodoli. Ond y mae’r cysyniad hyd yn oed wedi effeithio ar natur y setliad datganoli y mae Cymru’n meddu arno ar hyn o bryd.
Yn ôl atodiad i’r dystiolaeth ysgrifenedig a gyflwynodd Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Cymru a Phrif Weinidog Cymru i Bwyllgor Dethol Materion Cymreig y Tŷ Cyffredin ym mis Tachwedd 2005, yr oedd yna ddau ddewis ynglŷn â sut i roi cymhwysedd deddfwriaethol sylfaenol i’r Cynulliad, sef:−
- penodi’r pynciau mewn perthynas â’r hyn y caiff y Cynulliad ddeddfu arno (y model penodedig); neu,
- rhoi cymhwysedd llawn i’r Cynulliad ddeddfu gan eithrio materion a neilltuwyd i Senedd y Deyrnas Unedig (y model neilltuedig, a ddefnyddiwyd ar gyfer cymhwysedd deddfwriaethol Senedd yr Alban).36
Awgrymodd y dystiolaeth y cyntaf, a dyna’r opsiwn a ddewiswyd. Un o’r rhesymau dros y dewis oedd y ffaith nad oedd gan Gymru awdurdodaeth gyfreithiol ar wahân gyda chyfundrefn o lysoedd, barnwyr, proffesiwn cyfreithiol a darpariaeth ar gyfer addysg gyfreithiol. Yr oedd awdurdodaeth o’r fath yn cyd-fynd â’r gallu sydd gan Senedd yr Alban i wneud newidiadau ynglŷn â’r hyn a ddisgrifiwyd fel egwyddorion sylfaenol y gyfraith (basic principles of law).37 Gan nad oedd gan Gymru awdurdodaeth gyfreithiol ar wahân, nid oedd yn addas i’w deddfwrfa feddu ar y gallu i wneud y fath newidiadau.
Yn ôl yr atodiad, pe bai gan y Cynulliad yr un gallu cyffredinol i ddeddfu â Senedd yr Alban, buasai canlyniadau sylweddol ar gyfer undod awdurdodaeth gyfreithiol Cymru a Lloegr, oherwydd byddai’r llysoedd yn gorfod gweithredu egwyddorion a rheolau cyfreithiol yn gwbl wahanol mewn modd sylfaenol ar gyfer Cymru i’r rheini a weithredid ar gyfer Lloegr.38 O ganlyniad, dewiswyd y model penodedig o ddatganoli pwerau deddfwriaethol.
Gadewch inni am eiliad ystyried rhesymeg yr atodiad. Ni ellir gwadu y byddai cymhwysedd deddfwriaethol ar y model neilltuedig yn rhoi’r gallu i’r Cynulliad newid egwyddorion cyfreithiol sylfaenol, ond posibiliad yn unig yw hynny; nid yw datblygiad o’r fath yn rhywbeth anochel. Os ydym yn edrych ar wledydd ledled y byd a oedd unwaith yn cael eu rheoli gan Brydain ond sydd bellach yn wledydd annibynnol gyda’u hawdurdodaethau cyfreithiol eu hunain, a ydym yn gweld gwahaniaethau o’r fath y mae’r atodiad yn eu hofni? Yr ateb clir yw ‘Nac ydym’. Nid yn unig yng ngwledydd fel Awstralia a Chanada, sydd yn aelodau o’r Gymanwlad, ond hyd yn oed yng Ngweriniaeth Iwerddon a’r Unol Daleithiau, mae’r tebygrwydd rhwng y cyfundrefnau cyfreithiol yn parhau i fod mor agos ag i ganiatáu, er enghraifft, i athrawon cyfraith drosglwyddo heb lawer o drafferth o’r naill wlad i’r llall.
Hefyd, ac yn bwysig iawn, mae gradd anrhydedd yn y cyfreithiau oddi wrth brifysgolion Cymru a Lloegr yn cael ei derbyn yn nifer o wledydd fel cymhwyster yn eu cyfraith hwy, ac mae nifer o wledydd yn parhau i fynnu bod eu bargyfreithwyr yn ymgymhwyso yng Nghymru a Lloegr. Cafodd Awstralia ei Senedd ei hun ar ddechrau’r ugeinfed ganrif, ond yr oedd yn dal yn bosibl anfon achos ar apêl terfynol at Bwyllgor Barnwrol y Cyfrin-Gyngor hyd at 1968, ac yr oedd y barnwyr a oedd yn eistedd ar achosion o Awstralia yn aml iawn i gyd yn tarddu o’r Deyrnas Unedig, heb unrhyw brofiad o ymarfer neu farnu yn Awstralia.39 Er y byddai’n bosibl i wahaniaethau difrifol ddatblygu yn egwyddorion sylfaenol y gyfraith, nid yw hynny wedi digwydd. Mae’n anodd credu, felly, fod yna berygl y byddai’r Cynulliad yn deddfu mewn modd mor wahanol ag i greu ymraniad llwyr â gwledydd eraill teulu’r Gyfraith Gyffredin.
Addysgiadol yw cofio, hefyd, bod barnwyr o’r Alban heb brofiad o ymarfer neu farnu yng Nghymru a Lloegr, ac er gwaethaf traddodiad cyfreithiol gwir wahanol eu mamwlad, nid yn unig y maent wedi cael eu derbyn fel rhai cymwys i eistedd ar achosion o Gymru a Lloegr yn Nhŷ’r Arglwyddi, bellach yng Ngoruchaf Lys y Deyrnas Unedig, ond wedi cael eu hystyried ymhlith barnwyr mwyaf disglair y Llys – ystyriwch, fel un enghraifft ragorol, yr Arglwydd Reid a’i gyfraniadau at ddatblygiad cyfraith Cymru a Lloegr mewn nifer o feysydd, yn aml iawn mewn partneriaeth â barnwr disglair arall, sef yr Arglwydd Morris o Borth-y-Gest.
Yn yr un modd, y mae barnwyr o Gymru a Lloegr, heb unrhyw addysg neu brofiad yng nghyfraith yr Alban yn eistedd yn rheolaidd fel barnwyr apêl terfynol ar achosion o Lys y Sesiwn yng Nghaeredin.40 Os yw hynny’n bosibl ynglŷn â’r Alban, gyda hanes a thraddodiad cyfreithiol cwbl wahanol i Loegr, mae’n anodd credu na fydd barnwyr y Goruchaf Lys yn y dyfodol yn medru delio ag unrhyw ddatblygiadau a fydd yn deillio o gymhwyster deddfwriaethol y Cynulliad Cenedlaethol a dehongliadau llysoedd barn Cymreig.
Ni ellir beio gwleidyddion Cymru am gymryd yr hyn a oedd ar gael er mwyn datblygu hunaniaeth gyfreithiol y genedl, ond ni ellir chwaith osgoi’r ffaith bod gwleidyddion San Steffan ers talwm wedi cael y cysyniad o awdurdodaeth, gyda’i amryw ystyron, yn gyfleus iawn fel rheswm i wadu datblygiadau cyfreithiol i’n gwlad. Wrth bwysleisio bod angen cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân i gael cyfreithiau ar wahân, ceisiodd rhai rwystro deddfwriaeth ar wahân i Gymru, ac wedyn, pan ofynnwyd am gyfundrefn farnwrol, daeth yr ateb bod hyn yn amhosibl heb gyfreithiau gwahanol. Yn yr un modd, gwrthododd llywodraethau San Steffan am ddegawdau ganiatáu Ysgrifennydd Gwladol i Gymru ar sail diffyg awdurdodaeth. Bellach, mae Ysgrifennydd Gwladol, deddfwrfa a llywodraeth ein hunain gennym, er bod cymhwysedd eang i ddeddfu wedi cael ei atal unwaith eto oherwydd diffyg… awdurdodaeth.
Eto, ymhlith y dadleuon dichellgar a ddefnyddiwyd yn ystod y ganrif a hanner ddiwethaf, y mae egwyddorion cyfansoddiadol clir i’w cael fel sail gadarn i ofyn am gyfundrefn farnwrol i Gymru. Bellach y mae gan Gymru gorff o’i chyfreithiau ei hun, corff sy’n mynd i ddatblygu a hynny drwy weithrediadau deddfwrfa a llywodraeth frodorol. Gan fod angen i’r cyfreithiau hynny gael eu gweinyddu, ac nad oes unrhyw reswm call am eu gweithredu y tu allan i Gymru, mae’r alwad am gyfundrefn farnwrol Gymreig yn ddadl gref ar sail egwyddor gyfansoddiadol sydd eisoes wedi cael ei chydnabod.
Nid oes angen bellach wanhau’r ddadl drwy gymharu sefyllfa Cymru â sefyllfa’r Alban – a rhoi esgus i wrthwynebwyr chwilio am wahaniaethau rhwng y ddwy wlad, nac angen chwaith ddibynnu ar deimladau o genedlaetholdeb i gyfiawnhau’r alwad. Yn fwy pwysig byth, dylid osgoi gadael i’r gwrthwynebwyr symud y tir oddi wrth gwestiynau egwyddorol at gwestiynau cyllidol ac ymarferol. Ar ôl setlo’r egwyddor yw’r amser addas i ystyried y gost a phethau ymarferol. Mae hanes datblygiad cyfreithiol y Gymru gyfoes yn un diddorol iawn, ac y mae’r bennod olaf eto i’w hysgrifennu. Wrth i’r bennod honno gael ei hysgrifennu, byddai’n ddoeth cydnabod bod cynnwys y penodau cynharach nid yn unig yn ddiddorol ond hefyd yn addysgiadol.
Diolch yn fawr iawn.
1 Gweler Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru: Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol: Ymchwiliad i sefydlu awdurdodaeth ar wahân i Gymru – Rhagfyr 2011; Ymatebion i’r ymgynghoriad – Mawrth 2012.
2 Gweler Llywodraeth Cymru: Dogfen Ymgynghori: Awdurdodaeth Gyfreithiol ar Wahân ar gyfer Cymru – Rhif WG-15109 (27 Mawrth 2012).
3 “the only competent judge of the strength and purpose of the Welsh desires for separate judicial arrangements from those of England would, in our opinion, be a Welsh legislature or other legislative authority specially constituted under a scheme of Devolution to represent the people of Wales”. National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 11.
4 “we think that the creation of a Welsh judiciary should be effected if and when the Welsh legislature shall ask for it. It, if so desired, should be a Judiciary equal in independence to that of Scotland, with no appeal save to the House of Lords or its successor as the Supreme Appellate tribunal of the United Kingdom”; National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22
5 Llythyr (24/2/20) oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Ei Anrhydedd y Barnwr Rowland Rowlands, “I believe the scheme [ar gyfer cyfundrefn farnwrol ar wahân dros Gymru] has a powerful backing”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
6 Gweler, Syr John Thomas, “Legal Wales: Its Modern Origins and its Role after Devolution – National Identity, the Welsh Language and Parochialism” yn T.G. Watkin (gol.), Legal Wales: Its Past, Its Future (Caerdydd, 2001), 113−166.
7 Llythyr (18/5/44) oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Syr Alan Barlow: ‘the Scottish and English judicial systems are, except for the appeal to the House of Lords, wholly distinct and separate, and operate a separate jurisprudence founded on different principles with different origins. The English and Welsh system of jurisprudence is a uniform integral whole operating a system of jurisprudence which is uniform, and has regard to the same principles, and springs from the same origins. The substantive law of England and Wales is not similar but the same, except for some minor immaterial differences.’ National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
8 Parl. Deb. (Cyfres 3) cyf. 253 (1880) HC 30 Mehefin: “were they to have fractional or national legislation? They all highly respected and loved Wales, but, after all, it was but a small part of England” (Edward Warton). “But he did not know that it had been hitherto recognized that Wales should be treated in a different way from other portions of the Kingdom”. (Arthur Peel)
9 Parl. Deb. (Cyfres 3) cyf. 260 (1881) HC 4 Mai: colofnau 1772−1775.
10 “Wales should have restored to it the separate judiciary it once had”: Western Mail, Dydd Gwener, 26 Mawrth 1920.
11 Llythyr oddi wrth Neville Chamberlain at Morgan Jones AS (27/7/1938): “The analogy of Scotland has been advanced … I think, however, that it must be recognised that the two cases are not parallel. For Scotland has always had different systems of law and administration from those in force in England… Wales, on the other hand, since Henry VII’s (sic) Act of 1535, has been closely incorporated with England and there has not been, and is not now, any distinct law or administrative system calling for the attention of a separate Minister.”: LlGC, Papurau James Griffiths, C2/1.
12 Memorandwm oddi wrth pob un o’r 36 aelod seneddol o Gymru at y Prif Weinidog, Winston Churchill, (28/10/1943): National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
13 Llythyr oddi wrth Winston Churchill at Megan Lloyd George AS 2/1/1945: “Thank you for your letter of November 10 regarding the proposals of the Welsh Parliamentary Party for the establishment of a Secretary of State for Wales. The matter is, as you know, receiving consideration. The difficulty is that a proposal of this nature has such far reaching implications in the administrative sphere that detailed consideration has to be given it by the many authorities concerned. These authorities are of course heavily burdened with war tasks.”: LlGC, Papurau James Griffiths, C2/5.
14 Llythyr oddi wrth J.A. Barlow (Syr Alan Barlow) at Syr Claud Schuster (12/4/44): National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
15 Memorandwm oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Syr Alan Barlow (18/5/44) “It would, however, be unwise wholly to exclude from consideration the fact that there have been signs of agitation in Wales on this subject”: National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
16 Yn ei femorandwm (nodyn 15 uchod), dyfynnodd Schuster dystiolaeth Ithel Davies yn ôl Adroddiad y Comisiwn Peel (Cmd. 5065) 20/1/36, t. 371. “if the Welsh language is given its rightful and proper place in the administration of justice in Wales, there must be something like a fundamental reorganization of the judicial system in Wales to meet that measure of recognition”: National Archives, LCO 2/3214.
17 Parl. Deb. (Cyfres 3) cyf. 253 (1880) HC., 4 Mai: “Why should they have one Sunday Closing Bill for Wales, whose population, after all, only formed a small section of the community, but who, following the example of the Irish, fancied themselves a nation, and quite as famous as Ireland, while in point of fact, the Principality was only a small part of England? Wales, certainly, had not produced great men like Ireland” (Edward Warton AS).
18 Parl. Deb. (Cyfres 3) cyf. 253 (1880) HC., 15 Mehefin “The great fallacy was in trying to set up different little laws all over England, breaking the United Kingdom into sections for the purpose of carrying out the fads and fancies of fanatics.” (Edward Warton AS).
19 Llythyr oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at James W. Lowther AS (13/2/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507
20 Llythyr (24/2/20) oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Ei Anrhydedd y Barnwr Rowland Rowlands, “no doubt, within limits, the proposed change is desirable, but I have an idea that some of the proposals to be put forward – particularly those dealing with appeals etc. – are too extreme, at any rate for the present”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
21 Llythyr oddi wrth y Barnwr R. Rowlands at Syr Claud Schuster (29/2/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
22 Llythyr (1/3/20) oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Ei Anrhydedd y Barnwr R. Rowlands: “what it is beyond vague national sentiment which really actuates those who wish for a severance between Wales and England in these matters”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
23 Llythyr oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at B.J. Bridgeman (4/3/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
24 Llythyr oddi wrth y Barnwr R. Rowlands at Syr Claud Schuster (10/3/20): “National sentiment is no doubt largely responsible for the desire for complete severance between England and Wales – Many Welshmen demand for Wales the same position as that occupied by Scotland or Ireland. There are also practical objections to the present system”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
25 Llythyr oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Syr John Sankey (8/3/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507. 26 Llythyr oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster (9/3/20): National Archives, LCO 2/507.
27 Memorandwm ymhlith papurau National Archives, LCO 2/507.
28 Llythyr oddi wrth Syr Claud Schuster at Huw Edwards AS (26/4/20): “I do not think there is the smallest possibility that any Judge or Lord Justice who now holds office in the Supreme Court would abandon that office in order to have a place in a separate Welsh judiciary.”: National Archives, LCO 2/507.
29 “We recommend that any Devolution Statute should contain a clause providing in express terms that Wales may have a separate Judiciary and all needful accessory judicial institutions on application to the United Kingdom parliament by the Welsh Legislature.”: National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22
30 “There is a danger of throwing all this away to satisfy the insatiable demands of those who wish to have greater and greater devolution… There have always been only a few judges from Wales who were good enough for the High Court and Court of Appeal… There is just not the talent … as Wales is a small country… a separate jurisdiction would mean the continuation of the downward slope to separation and the break-up of the UK.” Gweler Cynulliad Cenedlaethol Cymru: Y Pwyllgor Materion Cyfansoddiadol a Deddfwriaethol: Ymchwiliad i sefydlu awdurdodaeth ar wahân i Gymru − Ymatebion i’r ymgynghoriad – Mawrth 2012: Tystiolaeth Dr. Peter Freeman, CLA WJ 1.
31 “Some of the arguments for and against Scottish independence are aimed at the heart… If Scots really want independence for political or cultural reasons, they should go for it. National pride is impossible to price. But if they vote for independence they should do so in the knowledge that their country could end up as one of Europe’s vulnerable, marginal economies. In the 18th century, Edinburgh’s fine architecture and its Enlightenment role earned it the nickname “Athens of the North”. It would be a shame if that name became apt again for less positive reasons.” The Economist, 14−20 April 2012.
32 Deddfau Barnweiniaeth 1873−75.
33 Government of Wales Act 2006, Explanatory Notes, ¶¶ 333, 334b): “in order to be within the Assembly’s legislative competence… the provision in question must apply only in relation to Wales”; ¶ 338b): “the provision in question may not “extend” to any jurisdiction other than England and Wales. (England and Wales is a single legal jurisdiction and Assembly Measures will form part of the law of that jurisdiction. Although they will only… apply to Wales”. Gweler hefyd ¶¶ 404 a 405b) yn ail-adrodd yr athrawiaeth ynglŷn â Deddfau’r Cynulliad.
34 “we think that the creation of a Welsh judiciary should be effected if and when the Welsh legislature shall ask for it.”; National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22
35 “We recommend that any Devolution Statute should contain a clause providing in express terms that Wales may have a separate Judiciary and all needful accessory judicial institutions on application to the United Kingdom parliament by the Welsh Legislature.”: National Archives, LCO 2/507, Draft Report, ¶ 22.
36 Primary Legislative Competence of the Assembly – Commentary, tystiolaeth ysgrifenedig a gyflwynwyd gan Ysgrifennydd Gwladol Cymru a Phrif Weinidog Cymru i Bwyllgor Dethol Materion Cymreig y Tŷ Cyffredin, Atodiad 2, 10 Tachwedd 2005, ¶ 1:
“When defining the subjects on which the Assembly will be able, subject to a “yes” vote in a referendum, to exercise primary legislative powers there are two broad options:
(a) to specify the subjects on which the Assembly may legislate (this is the model adopted in relation to Scotland in the Scotland Act 1978, which never came into force);
(b) to provide that the Assembly may legislate on anything unless it is specifically reserved to the UK Parliament and then to specify those reserved matters (which is the model adopted in relation to Scotland by the Scotland Act 1998
37 Atodiad 2, n. 36 uchod, ¶ 3–4:
Under the approach of the Scotland Act 1998 changes to the law which are made by the Scottish Parliament are not limited to specific subjects. They can include changes to basic principles of law.
Scotland has its own distinct legal jurisdiction, with its own system of courts, judges, legal profession and provision for legal education. An ability on the part of its legislature to change basic principles of law and specific rules relating to subjects such as land law which have a general impact across almost all day-to-day activities is consistent with this situation.
38 Atodiad 2, n. 36 uchod, ¶ 7:
If the Assembly had the same general power to legislate as the Scottish Parliament then the consequences for the unity of the England and Wales legal jurisdiction would be considerable. The courts would, as time went by, be increasingly called upon to apply fundamentally different basic principles of law and rules of law of general application which were different in Wales from those which applied in England. The practical consequence would be the need for different systems of legal education, different sets of judges and lawyers and different courts. England and Wales would become separate legal jurisdictions.
39 Gweler, fel enghraifft, Overseas Tankship (U.K.) Ltd. v Morts Dock & Engineering Co. The Wagon Mound [1961] AC 388, achos gerbron y Cyfrin-Gyngor o Awstralia gyda’r Arglwyddi Simonds, Reid, Morris o Borth-y-Gest, Radcliffe a Tucker fel barnwyr. Penderfynodd y Cyfrin-Gyngor argymell i’w Mawrhydi i ganiatau apêl y diffynnydd er bod Ustus Kinsella yn yr Uchel Lys ([1958] 1 Lloyd’s Rep. 575) a thri barnwr apêl yn y Goruchel Lys ([1959] 2 Lloyd’s Rep. 697) yn Ne Cymru Newydd wedi dyfarnu’n unfrydol o blaid y pleintydd.
40 Gweler, fel enghraifft, (M’Alister or) Donoghue v Stevenson [1932] AC 562, lle buasai’r barnwyr o Gymru a Lloegr, yr Arglwyddi Buckmaster a Tomlin, wedi penderfynu yn erbyn barn y ddau farnwr o’r Alban, yr Arglwyddi Macmillan a Thankerton, oni bai bod yr Arglwydd Atkin wedi cefnogi barn yr Albanwyr.
